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The Physical Presence Basis of Personal Jurisdiction
Ten Years After Shaffer v. Heitner:
A Rule in Search of a Rationale
A court must have personal jurisdiction over a party before it may
render a binding judgment against him. Modem courts may exercise ju-
risdiction over an individual in various ways. The oldest, and one of the
most controversial, is personally serving the defendant with process
while present in the state. This basis is known as the transient presence
or physical presence rule. The rule was given constitutional dimensions
in the celebrated case of Pennoyer v. Neff.'
In recent years, commentators have criticized Pennoyer as outmoded
and obsolete. It is widely thought that the Supreme Court's decision ten
years ago in Shaffer v. Heitner2 eliminated the transient presence rule.3
Courts may have replaced its theoretical basis, but the rule that it came to
stand for has survived. While commentators periodically read the rule's
obituary, the reality is that the reports of Pennoyer's death, to paraphrase
Mark Twain, have been greatly exaggerated.
4
This note examines the physical presence basis of personal jurisdic-
tion as applied to individuals. Part I traces the development of the rule
up to the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer. Part II analyzes Shaffer and
subsequent Supreme Court cases discussing personal jurisdiction. Part
III examines the post-Shaffer cases in the lower courts involving the phys-
ical presence rule. Part IV asserts that transient presence remains a part
of American jurisprudence, but with a somewhat confused theoretical ba-
sis, and suggests a theoretical framework for analyzing claims ofjurisdic-
tion based on in-state service of process.
I. The Historical Basis for Transient Jurisdiction
"The foundation ofjurisdiction is physical power." 5 With that state-
ment Justice Holmes summed up the traditional rationale for personal
jurisdiction. The power of a state to exercise in personam jurisdiction
over an individual correlates directly to its ability to exercise physical
power over that person.6 Historically, the way that physical power mani-
1 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See infra notes 16-26 and accompanying text.
2 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See infra notes 71-88 and accompanying text.
3 See, e.g., Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence inJurisdiction Theory?, 26 U. KAN. L.
REV. 61 (1977); Karst, The Supreme Court 1976 Term, 91 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1977); SedlerJudicialJuris-
diction and Choice of Law: The Consequences of Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 1031 (1978). Other
commentators, concerned that only a broad reading of Shaffer would mandate the end of transient
jurisdiction, were slightly more cautious in their appraisal of the case's impact. See Bernstine, Shaffer
v. Heitner: A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of In Personam Jurisdiction?, 25 ViLL. L. REv. 38
(1979); Fyr, Shaffer v. Heitner: The Supreme Court's Latest Words on State Court Jurisdiction, 26 EMORY L.
J. 739 (1977).
4 Twain, Cable from London to the Associated Press (June 2, 1897).
5 McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 91 (1915).
6 The common law principle was that a state court had the power to issue a valid judgment in
the absence of a traditional basis for jurisdiction if that state's legislature decided to permit it. That
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fested itself in jurisdiction was personal service of process. When a per-
son was served with process inside the territorial limits of a state,
jurisdiction was complete.
A. Early Development of the Rule
Early American decisions viewed jurisdiction over a transient de-
fendant as a given. The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusettes in
Barrell v. Benjamin 7 upheld jurisdiction in a case between two Connecticut
citizens where the defendant was served with a writ of arrest8 while in
Boston about to embark for his home in Connecticut. The defendant did
not even temporarily reside in Massachusetts. The court stated that no
basis existed for distinguishing between resident and nonresident de-
fendants. 9 A more important question for the Barrell court was whether a
nonresident plaintiff could sue a transient defendant. The court found
that since a Massachusetts citizen could routinely sue anyone who came
into the state, the Constitution required states to extend the same rights
and privileges to all United States' citizens.' 0
The few reported decisions from the nineteenth century indicate
that the doctrine of obtaining personal jurisdiction over transient de-
fendants based on in-state service of process" was settled law.' 2 The
decisions were apparently based on the concept of power, where a state
has authority over anyone found within it. As a sovereign, the authority
of a state could not be questioned.
The early cases frequently cited Justice Story's Commentaries on the
Conflict of Laws, the earliest major work on the subject. Justice Story not
judgment was binding in that state's courts. Such ajudgment, however, was only necessarily binding
in the state that issued it. Other states are not bound to enforce the judgment unless the state court
that issued it exercised jurisdiction using one of the traditional bases, such as physical presence. A
sister state is not bound to give full faith and credit to a judgment issued without personal jurisdic-
tion as it was traditionally recognized. A state court judgment issued without personal jurisdiction,
which a party subsequently sought to enforce in a sister state, was a "futile attempt to extend the
authority and control of a state beyond its own territory." Baker v. Baker, Eccles & Co., 242 U.S.
394 (1917). With the adoption of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, the
exercise of jurisdiction without basis became a violation of due process and void even in the state
that issued it. See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 43 (1934).
7 15 Mass. 354 (1819).
8 Early English practice required the sheriff to bring the defendant physically before the court
under a writ of arrest and hold him there until he posted a bond sufficient to cover the civil claim
against him. 3 W. HoLDSwoRTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 626 (5th ed. 1942). Early American
decisions supported this concept. A later Massachusetts court recognized that service by summons
was equally as effective as service by writ of arrest. Peabody v. Hamilton, 106 Mass. 217, 222 (1870).
9 15 Mass. at 357.
10 Id. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1. See also Roberts v. Knights, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 449, 451
(1863) (decision based in part on a 1650 statute authorizingjurisdiction over transient defendants).
11 Many cases involve actions to enforce ajudgment granted in another state where the action in
the first forum state was based solely on in-state service. The willingness of other states to enforce
judgments based on transitory presence allowed a plaintiff to sue in any forum in which he could
personally serve the defendant, regardless of the inconvenience to the defendant who may have had
no contacts whatsoever with the state. The successful plaintiff could then enforce the judgment by
bringing a second action in whatever state he could find the defendant's property. See, e.g., Darrah v.
Watson, 36 Iowa 116 (1872).
12 The language of Badger v. Towle, 48 Maine 20, 21 (1860), is typical: "This court has jurisdic-
tion in personal actions between parties not resident in the state, if the defendant is found and duly
summoned when temporarily within the state." See also Lovejoy v. Abee, 33 Maine 414 (1851);
Nelson v. Omaley, 6 Maine 218 (1829).
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only provides as black letter law that a state has full in personamjurisdic-
tion over everyone present within its territory, but also states the ration-
ale in terms of sovereignty.13 In this view, the state possesses absolute
authority to adjudicate the claims and rights of those within its bounda-
ries and no power to reach outside its territorial limits to bind persons.'
4
Each state's power is a function of its sovereignty where each person
owes at least temporary allegiance to the sovereign of the territory he is
in.' 5 Since a sovereign has full authority over its subjects or citizens, the
sovereign state has full in personam jurisdiction to adjudicate the rights
and liabilities of those present within its borders.
B. The Rule Becomes Entrenched
The year 1877 brought the landmark decision in the area, the still
famous case of Pennoyer v. Neff. 6 This case gave constitutional weight to
the rule of physical presence which became both necessary and sufficient
to confer full in personam jurisdiction to the courts of a state.' 7 In Pen-
noyer, Mitchell, an Oregon citizen, sued Neff, a California citizen, in an
Oregon court to recover unpaid legal fees. Neff was not served with pro-
cess in Oregon.' 8 Service was made, pursuant to Oregon statute, by
publication. Neff did not appear at the trial and Mitchell obtained a de-
faultjudgment. At a court ordered sale to satisfy the judgment, property
of Neff was sold to Pennoyer.' 9
Neff argued that the sale to Pennoyer was invalid because the Ore-
gon court did not have personal jurisdiction to render a valid judgment
over him in the first action.20 The Supreme Court, with Justice Field
writing the majority opinion, agreed with Neff and upheld invalidation of
the sale.2 ' The Court rested its decision squarely on grounds of state
sovereignty. Justice Field described a system of state court jurisdiction
that followed from two well-established principles of public law. 22 The
twin principles were that each state possessed exclusive jurisdiction over
all persons within its territory and no direct authority over persons
outside its territory.23 Justice Field noted that states are independent ex-
cept where restrained by the Constitution.24 Among a state's powers is
the authority to bind anyone found and served while within the state.25
13 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT BETWEEN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC LAWS 905-11
(4th ed. 1852).
14 See Darrah, 36 Iowa at 120; Putnam v. Dike, 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 535, 536 (1859).
15 J. STORY, supra note 13, at 908.
16 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
17 See generally R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 133 (2d ed. 1980).
18 95 U.S. at 716.
19 Id. at 719-20.
20 Id. at 716.
21 Id. at 736.
22 Id. at 720.
23 Id. at 722. The Court citedJustice Story's treatise, supra note 13, as authority for the position.
24 95 U.S. at 722.
25 Justice Field also discussed the fourteenth amendment, even though it did not become effec-
tive until after the judgment in the original proceeding by Mitchell against Neff. While the discus-
sion was technically dictum, other courts accepted it as law. The Court stated that the adoption of
the fourteenth amendment allowed a person to directly challenge judgments issued without personal
jurisdiction in a collateral proceeding. The Court also stated that a judgment issued without per-
19871 NOTES
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The Court found that the Oregon court did not have personal jurisdic-
tion over Neff since he was not personally served while within Oregon. 2
6
While the idea that physical presence was necessary for the assertion
ofjurisdiction quickly vanished, 27 the twin concept of sufficiency of per-
sonal service while inside the state persisted. State courts continued to
assert jurisdiction based solely on transient presence. 28 The decisions
use matter of fact language in discussing the issue and are for the most
part conclusory. 29 It is perhaps surprising that citations to Pennoyer are
conspicuously absent. Most decisions omit Pennoyer altogether, and
those that include it expressly say that it is supportive, but not control-
ling.3 0 This shows that the physical presence rule of Pennoyer merely ex-
pressed traditional state law, rather than creating new law.
Despite the general paucity of discussion of principles to justify the
physical presence rule in the cases, some state courts discussed the theo-
retical underpinnings of the state power theory. A Georgia case treated
the defendant's mere presence in the state as the functional equivalent of
citizenship for jurisdictional purposes.3 1 This position finds historical
support in Justice Story's treatise. Traditional ideas of sovereignty and
power form its basis. The state as sovereign has power to bind all per-
sons within its territory. Persons, by the act of entering the territory, owe
temporary allegiance to the local sovereign.
3 2
Reed v. Hollister33 is a variation of this approach, focusing on a per-
son's expectations. The Oregon Supreme Court held that by voluntarily
going into the state the defendant submitted to the state's jurisdiction,3
4
sonal jurisdiction was not only not entitled to fall faith and credit in sister states, but was also void in
the state that issued it. Id. at 732-33.
26 Id. at 736.
27 Courts generally accepted three exceptions to the presence requirement applicable between
the various states: (1) domicile (A court can exercise jurisdiciton over a person in the state of his
domicile, which is normally the place of his home. See R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 17, at 12-14.); (2)
consent (The defendant voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the court.); and (3) long-arm juris-
diction (jurisdiction is based on the defendant performing some act within the state or having some
effect within the state.). See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAw §§ 35-42 (3d ed. 1977). See also
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 77 (1934).
28 Lee v. Baird, 139 Ala. 526, 36 So. 720 (1904); Smith v. Gibson, 83 Ala. 284, 3 So. 321 (1888);
McDaniel v. Alford, 97 S.E. 673 (Ga. 1918); Reeves v. Southern Ry. Co., 123 Ga. 697, 49 S.E. 674
(1905); Rice v. Brown, 81 Me. 56, 15 A. 334 (1888); Alley v. Caspari, 80 Me. 234, 14 A. 12 (1888);
Hieston v. National City Bank of Chicago, 132 Md. 389, 104 A. 281 (1918); Thompson v. Crowell,
148 Mass. 552, 20 N.E. 170 (1889); Johnston v. Trade Ins. Co., 132 Mass. 432 (1882); Williams v.
Simon, 128 S.C. 315, 122 S.E. 772 (1924); Ford v. Calhoun, 53 S.C. 106, 30 S.E. 830 (1898); Bow-
man v. Flint, 37 Tex. Civ. App. 28, 82 S.W. 1049 (1904).
29 See, e.g., Gibson, 83 Ala. at 285, 3 So. at 321 where the court stated:
It is not a debatable question that such actions may be maintained in any jurisdiction in
which the defendant may be found, and is legally served with process. However transiently
the defendant may have been in the state, the summons having been legally served upon
him, the jurisdiction of his person was complete ....
30 Simon, 128 S.C. 315, 122 S.E. 772; Calhoun, 53 S.C. 106, 30 S.E. 830. Only one federal case,
Mason v. Connors, 129 F. 831 (D. Vt. 1904), cites Pennoyer as controlling authority.
31 "All persons found witin the limits of this state are to be deemed so far citizens thereof as that
the right ofjurisdiction will attach to such persons." Hines v. Moore, 148 S.E. 162, 164 (Ga. 1929).
32 J. STORY, supra note 13, at 908.
33 106 Or. 407, 212 P. 367 (1923). This case involved an action in Oregon state court to enforce
a judgment rendered in California. Id. at 409, 212 P. at 368. The California court obtained jurisdic-
tion based on the defendant's very temporary presence in the state. Id. at 413, 212 P. at 369.
34 Id. at 413, 212 P. at 369.
[Vol. 62:713
suggesting an expectation justification. By entering a state's territory, a
person must reasonably expect he may be brought into court there.3 5
The concept of physical presence as sufficient to grant jurisdiction
became fully ingrained into the country's jurisprudence. The First Re-
statement provided that a state can exercise jurisdiction over anyone vol-
untarily inside its territory, whether permanently or transiently.
36
Professor Beale, the Reporter for the First Restatement, and perhaps the
most influential writer of the first half of this century, fully supported an
extreme exercise of transient jurisdiction: "It is immaterial that the per-
son has come into the state for a merely temporary purpose. This is true
even though the person is served while in transit through the state."
37
C. The Minimum Contacts Test as an Alternative to Physical Presence
Dissatisfied with the relatively narrow exceptions to the strict Pen-
noyer requirement of physical presence,38 the Supreme Court in 1945 an-
nounced its decision in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.39 The Court
shifted away from a mechanical test towards one more in line with cur-
rent realities. The Court held that due process requires that "in order to
subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with
it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional no-
tions of fair play and substantial justice.' "40
The traditional physical presence test of Pennoyer survived Interna-
tional Shoe. The Court clearly phrased minimum contacts as an alterna-
tive to physical presence. The minimum contacts test is an additional
jurisdictional means to the physical presence rule, not a replacement. 4'
This indicates the depth to which physical presence was ingrained.
While announcing a major change in personal jurisdiction, the Court was
unwilling to challenge the concept of state power over those physically
present within the state.
4 2
35 Id. at 414, 212 P. at 369.
36 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 78 (1934). The Restatement also adds that
while common law required personal service of process, modem statutes could permissibly author-
ize an alternative method of process if they gave reasonable notice to the defendant and the defend-
ant was served while physically present in the state. Id. § 78 comment c.
37 J. BEALE, TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 339-40 (1935).
38 See supra note 27.
39 326 U.S. 310 (1945). The state of Washington assessed unemployment compensation taxes
on the International Shoe Co., a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Mis-
souri. Id. at 311-12. It employed 11 to 13 salesmen who resided and worked in Washington. Id. at
313. The company refused to pay the tax and the state Tax Commissioner sued in Washington state
court. Id. at 312. Pursuant to state statute, the Commissioner served the company by serving one of
the local sales agents (an act that did not grantjurisdiction under Pennoyer since the salesman was not
authorized to accept binding service on the company) and by mailing a copy of the process to the
company's principal office in Missouri. Id. The state trial court and the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton upheld jurisdiction. 22 Wash. 2d 146, 154 P.2d 801 (1945). The United States Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the defendant had sufficient minimum contacts to make the assertion ofjuris-
diction fair. 326 U.S. at 320.
40 326 U.S. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
41 Id.
42 It is open to question, however, whether the Court intended with this language to create an
exception to the minimum contacts test based on state sovereignty and Pennoyer, or instead, whether
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This recognition of physical presence as a single factor sufficient to
confer jurisdiction is even more striking given the Court's explanation.
The Court gave four factors in its minimum contacts analysis: (1) a de-
fendant is subject to jurisdiction in a forum in which he has had continu-
ous and systematic contacts which give rise to the particular litigation
involved; (2) the single act or sporadic acts of the defendant are not suffi-
cient to give jurisdiction over acts unrelated to those acts; (3) the contin-
uous acts of the defendant may be so substantial to subject the defendant
to jurisdiction on any cause of action; and (4) sporadic acts, or even a
single act of the defendant, is sufficient to give jurisdiction for claims
arising out of that act or acts if they are of a certain nature or quality.
43
The second factor dearly states that a single act is not sufficient to grant
jurisdiction over claims unrelated to that act.44 Despite this stricture, the
Court recognized that presence in the forum was sufficient to grant
jurisdiction. 4
5
In the late fifties the Supreme Court decided two more important
personal jurisdiction cases. McGee v. International Life Insurance Co. 46 rep-
resents the broadest application of personal jurisdiction given to date by
the Supreme Court.47 The Court upheld a California court's exercise of
jurisdiction over a Texas insurance company based on one isolated,
although arguably continuing, contact. 48 Importantly, the Court recog-
nized jurisdiction as proper when only one contact existed-the single
factor analysis some commentators use to describe exercises ofjurisdic-
tion based on a single factor such as in-state service of process. 49 These
findings, coupled with the Court's comments on the growing ease of de-
fending lawsuits in foreign states, 50 and that mere inconvenience to the
defendant is not sufficient to defeat jurisdiction, 5' point to a broad and
it wanted to indicate that the physical presence of the defendant was itself a sufficient minimum
contact.
43 Id. at 317-18.
44 The Court stated that it would "lay too great and unreasonable a burden on the corporation
to comport with due process." Id. at 317. While International Shoe spoke in terms of corporations,
courts have extended its reasoning to individuals. Moreover, it seems that if it is unfair to require a
corporation to defend a suit in a state in which it does at least some business, it is even more unfair
to require an individual, with presumably less resources, to defend a suit in a state away from his
home on the basis he was fortuitously found and served there.
45 Id. at 316.
46 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
47 The defendant was a Texas insurance company that offered to continue a policy issued by
Empire Mutual to the plaintiff's decedent, a resident of California. The decedent accepted the offer
and mailed premium payments from his home in California to the defendant's offices in Texas. This
policy was the only contact defendant had with California. After the death of the decedent, the
defendant refused to pay the claim. The beneficiary brought suit in California state court. Defend-
ant was served by registered mail. The California court based its jurisdiction on a state statute that
permitted jurisdiction over nonresident insurance companies that held policies with state residents
even though a person could not serve the company within the state. The plaintiff obtained a judg-
ment against the insurance company and sought to enforce it in Texas. The Texas courts refused to
give the judgment full faith and credit, claiming that the California court lacked personal jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 221.
48 Id. at 223.
49 See generally Vernon, Single-Factor Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction-A Speculation of the Impact of
Shaffer v. Heitner, 63 IowA L. REv. 997 (1978).
50 355 U.S. at 223.
51 Id. at 224.
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loose application of the minimum contacts analysis of International Shoe.
McGee indicates it is possible that service of process while physically pres-
ent in the forum may be a single factor sufficient to meet the minimum
contacts test, independent of the continuing vitality of the state power
concept.5 2 McGee, citing Pennoyer, noted that the due process clause
"placed some limit on the power of state courts to enter binding judg-
ments against persons not served with process within their bounda-
ries." 5 3 Thus, the Court recognized both the continued existence of
state sovereignty concerns, and by implication, jurisdiction by service of
process alone.
The next year, Hanson v. Denckla54 dispelled any ideas that McGee
signalled a loosening of the jurisdictional restraints the due process
clause imposed. The Court stated that the trend away from the rigidity
of Pennoyer to the minimum contacts analysis of International Shoe and Mc-
Gee did not herald the end of restraints on the exercise of state court
jurisdiction. 55 While the Court recognized the importance of state sover-
eignty concerns, 56 it focused on what acts of the defendant are sufficient
to meet the minimum contacts test. The Court stressed that the defend-
ant must do something to affiliate himself with the forum. "[I]t is essen-
tial in each case that there be some act by which the defendant purposely
avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
state, thus invoking the benefits and protections of its laws."' 57 McGee not
only restricted the class of defendants that courts could exercise jurisdic-
tion over, it demonstrated the importance of the defendant's purposeful
acts. In a case involving the assertion of jurisdiction based solely on in-
state service of process, the defendant's voluntary presence in the state
could be the single purposeful act required since the person places him-
self under the protection of that state's laws by entering the state.
Lower courts continued to accept the concept of transient jurisdic-
tion. 58 The Second Restatement recognized that a state has jurisdiction
52 This interpretation is consistent with the approach Justice Stevens took in his concurring
opinion in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See infra notes 86-88 and accompanying text.
53 355 U.S. at 222.
54 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The rather convoluted facts of Hanson involved the probate of Dora
Donner's will after her death in Florida. While domiciled in Pennsylvania Mrs. Donner executed a
trust instrument naming a Delaware trust company as trustee. Id. at 238. Mrs. Donner later became
domiciled in Florida. From time to time she sent orders to Delaware regarding the trust, and re-
ceived income from the trust while in Florida. Id. at 253. After her death, two of her daughters,
residuary legatees under the will, brought an action in Florida seeking to have the testamentary
appointment of probate property to the trust set aside. Id. at 240. A separate action was brought in
Delaware by the executrix of the will to determine who was entitled to the trust assets. Id. at 242.
These cases reached contrary conclusions. The Florida Supreme Court in its holding asserted juris-
diction over the Delaware trustees. Id. at 241. The Supreme Court ruled that Florida did not have
jurisdiction over the trustees and reversed the Florida ruling. Id. at 251.
55 Id. at 251.
56 The restraints are not merely to protect defendants against inconvenient litigation, but
"[t]hey are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of the respective States." Id.
57 Id. at 253.
58 For example, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Nielson v. Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 119
N.W.2d 737 (1963), upheld a Minnesota court's exercise ofjurisdiction over an Iowa resident on a
cause of action arising in Iowa based on service of process while the defendant was temporarily in
Minnesota for lunch. Id. at 482, 119 N.W.2d at 738. The Minnesota Supreme Court dismissed the
defendant's objection to jurisdiction as frivolous. Id. at 484, 119 N.W.2d at 739. The court stated
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over any individual present in the state, whether permanently or even
"for an instant." 59 The exercise of transient jurisdiction reached absurd
heights in Grace v. MacArthur60 where residents of Arkansas planned to
serve a resident of Illinois on a cause of action arising in Illinois while he
was stopped in an Arkansas airport on a flight from Memphis, Tennessee
to Dallas, Texas. The flight plan of the commercial airliner changed and
the plane did not land in Arkansas. 6' Instead, the process server handed
the process to the defendant while the airplane was in flight over Arkan-
sas. 62 The district court found that this constituted service of process
within the territorial limits of Arkansas and upheld jurisdiction.
63
One year before the Supreme Court's decision in Shaffer v. Heitner,
64
the First Circuit in Donald Manter Co., Inc. v. Davis 65 unambiguously ap-
proved transient jurisdiction. A New Hampshire corporation brought
suit in New Hampshire against two individuals on a contract made and to
be performed in Vermont. The defendant Davis was personally served
with process while temporarily in New Hampshire on unrelated business.
The other individual was not served and dismissal of the action against
him on jurisdictional grounds was unquestioned. The New Hampshire
district court also granted Davis' motion to dismiss on grounds that New
Hampshire lacked personal jurisdiction. 66 The Court of Appeals, citing
"black letter law," 67 reversed. 68 The First Circuit rejected the defend-
ant's argument that the International Shoe line of cases and considerations
of fairness rejected transient jurisdiction. 69 The court stated that those
cases were concerned "with expanding jurisdiction beyond traditional
limits, not with contracting it.
'7°
II. The Supreme Court's Recent Reassessment
A. The Shaffer Decision
The Supreme Court's most important recent decision on personal
jurisdiction came a century after Pennoyer was decided. Shaffer v. Heitner
7 1
that International Shoe only dealt with substituted service of process out of state, not personal service
while physically present in the state. Id. at 483, 119 N.W.2d at 738.
59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 & comment a (1971). The drafters found
this true even if the result is unfair to the defendant or inconsistent with the basic principle of rea-
sonableness underlying jurisdiction. Id. Three factors form the basis for the existing rules ofjuris-
diction. In addition to concerns for fair play and substantial justice, and for protecting interstate
relations, the comment cites the force of usage and tradition as the reason for the continuing use of a
traditional rule that may no longer comport with modem ideas. Id. § 24 comment b (1971).
60 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959).
61 J. MARTIN, CONFLICT OF LAWS 512 n.12 (1978).
62 170 F. Supp. at 443.
63 Id. at 447-48.
64 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
65 543 F.2d 419 (1st Cir. 1976).
66 Id. at 419-20.
67 Id. at 420.
68 Id. The court stated that the defendant's remedy for an unfair forum was to move for a




71 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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involved a shareholder's derivative action against twenty-eight current
and former directors and officers of the Greyhound Corporation, a Dela-
ware corporation with its principal place of business in Arizona, for
breach of fiduciary duty involving certain actions in Oregon.72 The suit,
quasi in rem in nature, 73 was based on the sequestration of common
stock in the Greyhound corporation owned by the defendants pursuant
to a state statute that all stock in a Delaware corporation is located in
Delaware regardless of the actual situs of the certificates. 74 The Supreme
Court held that Delaware did not have jurisdiction over the defendants.
75
Shaffer, like all of the Supreme Court cases discussed in this section,
did not involve a defendant personally served with process in the forum
state, butJustice Marshall, who wrote the Court's opinion in Shaffer, went
out of his way to give a holding that purported to bind all applications of
jurisdiction, arguably far broader than necessary to dispose of the case.
76
However, since the Supreme Court has not specifically spoken on tran-
sient jurisdiction, it is necessary to apply the concepts used in Shaffer and
its progeny to the physical presence rule. Justice Marshall wrote the
Court's decison with seemingly extreme breadth: "We therefore con-
clude that all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated ac-
cording to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny."
77
Several aspects of the Shaffer opinion have an important bearing on
the transient presence basis of jurisdiction. The Court first concluded
that state sovereignty, which formed the basis of Pennoyer, no longer is
the central concern of personal jurisdiction. 78 The Court concluded that
72 The actions led to a significant civil antitrust judgment and criminal contempt fines against
the company. Id. at 189-90.
73 An action quasi in rem is one in which some property of the defendant is found in the forum
state and held to satisfy the plaintiff's claim. The presence of the property alone was thought to
provide the jurisdictional basis for the state to exercise judicial jurisdiction over a claim unrelated to
that property. The action is not in personam in that any judgment is limited to the amount of the
property attached and the defendant's property in other states is not affected. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF CONFLcr OF LAws ch. 3 introductory note (1971).
74 433 U.S. at 190 (citing DEL. CODE: ANN., tit. 10, § 366 (1975)). This type of statute declaring
that the situs of stock in a corporation is located in the state of incorporation was contrary to § 13 of
the Uniform Stock Transfer Act and unique to Delaware. Commentators have criticized this ap-
proach. See Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware: A Constitutional Analysis, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 749
(1973); Note, Attachment of Corporate Stock: The Conflicting Approaches of Delaware and the Uniform Stock
Transfer Act, 73 HARv. L. REV. 1579 (1960). In addition to the conceptual problems, the statute did
not provide any procedures for a hearing prior to the seizure or permit the defendant to make a
limited appearance. Defendants had to either submit to the state's full in personam jurisdiction or
forfeit the property. The Delaware state courts focused on the issue of whether the statute violated
procedural due process and gave the personal jurisdiction question only summary treatment. Grey-
hound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976).
75 433 U.S. at 216-17.
76 Id. at 219 (Stevens, J., concurring). The Court could have based its decision on the issue of
the Delaware sequestration statute which was the basis for the state court opinion. Instead, the
Court decided the case on a minimum contacts issue that "was never pleaded by appellee, made the
subject of discovery, or ruled on by the Delaware courts." Id. at 220 (Brennan,J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
77 Id. at 212. The Court did not discuss whether the assertions ofjurisdiction upheld in previous
cases would be valid under this standard. Instead, it merely stated that to "the extent that prior
decisions are inconsistent with this standard, they are overruled." Id. n.39.
78 Id. at 204. The Court recognized that state power formed the basis for jurisdiction under the
Pennoyer regime. The state had power over all persons or property found within its borders. Id. at
199. Justice Marshall in a footnote dismissed the concerns of the Hanson Court 20 years earlier that
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International Shoe displaced Pennoyer as the basis for in personamjurisdic-
tion. 79 Indeed, Justice Marshall speaks of "the collapse of the in per-
sonam wing of Pennoyer." 0 The Court explicitly stated that concerns for
fairness demands more than the mere presence of property in a state to
confer jurisdiction.8' The presence of property may suggest other ties
sufficient to satisfy a minimum contacts test and thus confer jurisdiction,
but the plaintiff must establish them.
8 2
Justice Marshall emphasized concerns for fairness that the single fac-
tor of presence cannot satisfy.8 3 Given this concern, and the sweeping
language of the opinion, it is perhaps fair to conclude that the Court in
Shaffer intended for the minimum contacts test to apply to the single fac-
tor analysis of personal jurisdiction based on physical presence as well as
to quasi in rem actions. But even if the Court intended this, it remains
pure dictum since the Court was faced with a case of quasi in rem juris-
diction, not transient presence. Moreover, while the Court intimated
that the minimum contacts test, requiring a relationship between the de-
fendant, the forum, and the litigation, had been the correct test for per-
sonal jurisdiction since International Shoe,84 the state of the law in the
period between International Shoe and Shaffer differed. Lower courts as-
serted jurisdiction over defendants based on nothing more than in-state
service of process without a minimum contacts analysis.8 5 Thus, it is at
least questionable whether the Court intended to change the rules re-
garding transient presence.
8 6
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, came to a different conclu-
sion. He viewed the question of jurisdiction as one of fair notice; a per-
son voluntarily entering a state assumes the risk that that state will
exercise jurisdiction over him.8 7 Thus, the issue to Justice Stevens was
one of purposeful availment. This view obviously permits the mainte-
nance of actions based solely on physical presence. Jurisdiction is not
states would encroach on other states judicial prerogatives. "The Hanson Court's statement that
restrictions on state jurisdiction 'are a consequence of territorial limitations on the power of respec-
tive States,' simply makes the point that the States are defined by their geographic territory." Id. at
204 n.20 (citation omitted). See note 56 supra. It is doubtful that the Hanson Court regarded its
statement on state sovereignty to be the mere truism thatJustice Marshall dismissed. See Lewis, The
Three Deaths of "State Sovereignty" and the Curse of Abstraction in the Jurisprudence of Personal Jurisdiction, 58
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 699, 710-11 (1983).
79 433 U.S. at 206.
80 Id. at 205.
81 Id. at 209.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 212.
84 Id. at 204.
85 See supra text accompanying notes 58-70. It is fair to assume that the Court was aware of the
state of the law concerning the transient presence rule.
86 This argument is buttressed by combining the holdings of Shafer and International Shoe. Shaffer
held that courts must evaluate all assertions ofjurisdiction according to the standards ofInternational
Shoe. 433 U.S. at 212. However, International Shoe expressly removed jurisdiction based on physical
presence in the forum state from the scope of its holding. 326 U.S. at 316. The Court in Shafer at a
different point described the standard for assessing in personam jurisdiction as "the minimum con-
tacts standard elucidated in International Shoe." 433 U.S. at 207. It is unclear whether the Court, in
making this statement, took into account the limiting language in International Shoe regarding physi-
cal presence.
87 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J, concurring).
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based on ideas of state power, but on a more modem standard, one of
purposeful availment.88 Under this view, physical presence in the state
becomes the one significant contact necessary to support jurisdiction.
B. Shaffer Refined
Justice Marshall's dismissal of state sovereignty concerns seemingly
was forgotten three years later in World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Wood-
son.89 While noting that recent cases have relaxed the limits on jurisdic-
tion, Justice White, writing for the majority, asserted that "we have never
accepted the proposition that state lines are irrelevant for jurisdictional
purposes, nor could we and remain faithful to the principles of interstate
federalism embodied in the Constitution.
' 90
The case not only illustrated a rebirth of concern for sovereignty by
the court, but also demonstrated the change in focus in the sovereignty
issue since Pennoyer.91 The primary focus of sovereignty is no longer to
confer power on a state based on the presence of persons or property
within its territory. Rather, it acts to divest a state of power over some-
thing that is arguably present within its borders, based on concerns for
the interests of sister states. However, Justice White defined the mini-
mum contacts standard as having a bifurcated function. The functions
are related, but distinguishable, according to Justice White. It not only
"protects the defendant against the burdens of litigating in a distant or
inconvenient forum," it also "acts to ensure that States, through their
courts, do not reach out beyond the limits imposed on them by their
status as coequal sovereigns in a federal system."' 92 Indeed, in some cir-
88 See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). Although not at all clear from the opinion,
it is possible to read Justice Stevens' concurrence alternately as supporting a continuation of the
physical presence exception to the minimum contacts rule explicitly contained in International Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316, and possibly contained implicitly in Shaffer. This reading would corroborate the
conclusion that the ambiguous, though sweeping, language ofJustice Marshall in the majority opin-
ion did not signal that the Court intended to do away with the time honored basis of physical
presence.
89 444 U.S. 286 (1980). The case involved a products liability action that Harry and Kay Robin-
son brought for injuries sustained when another car rear-ended their Audi, causing a fire. The acci-
dent occurred in Oklahoma where the Robinsons were enroute to Arizona from their former
residence in New York. They purchased the car in New York. Id. at 288. The Robinsons sued the
manufacturer, Audi, the importer, Volkswagen of America, the regional distributer, World-Wide
Volkswagen, and the retail dealer, Seaway. Id. Judge Woodson of the Oklahoma state district court
exercised jurisdiction over all defendants based on the Oklahoma long-arm statute. Id. at 289. The
Oklahoma Supreme Court upheld this determination. Id. at 289-90. Audi and Volkswagen did not
appeal. The case came to the Supreme Court on appeal from Seaway and World-Wide. Id. at 288-
89. The Supreme Court reversed. Id. at 299.
90 Id. at 292. The Court's reliance on Hanson for its sovereignty conclusions is particularly sur-
prising sinceJustice White totally ignored the Shaffer Court's summary dismissal of Hanson's sover-
eignty concerns. See supra note 78.
91 One conclusion was that World-Wide Volkswagen transformed sovereignty from a "self-con-
tained quality designed simply to preserve the dignity of the individual state," to "an essential ele-
ment of interstate federalism." Ripple & Murphy, World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson:
Reflections on the Road Ahead, 56 NoTRE DAME LAW. 65, 75 (1980). Another commentator, speaking
with the benefit of added time, concluded bluntly that "the neo-sovereign utterances of the Court
since International Shoe enjoy scant standing in precedent, amount to little more than fanciful obiter
dicta on facts that fell short of satisfying party-fairness standards, and make no discernible decisional
difference." Lewis, supra note 78, at 716.
92 444 U.S. at 291-92.
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cumstances, sovereignty concerns may divest a state ofjurisdiction, even
if litigation in that state would cause the defendant little or no inconven-
ience.93 This view of sovereignty conflicts with the territorial power the-
ory94 that formed the historical basis of transient jurisdiction. 95
While World-Wide Volkswagen seems to take away jurisdiction based
on physical presence with one hand, the decision with the other hand
breathes new life into transient jurisdiction with its dicussion of mini-
mum contacts. The Court focused on foreseeability in looking for mini-
mum contacts. 96 Justice White first stated that foreseeability in the sense
that a producer should foresee a product finding its way into a state is not
by itself sufficient.97 Foreseeability can, however, form the basis for the
exercise of jurisdiction. If the defendant should reasonably foresee that
his activities could subject him to the jurisdiction of a state, then a court
can exercise jurisdiction consistently with due process. 98 In support of
this proposition the Court cited with approval Justice Stevens' concur-
ring opinion in Shaffer 99 and also used the purposeful availment language
of Hanson. ' 00
This argument seems to implicitly support the exercise of transient
jurisdiction. A court could exercise jurisdiction based on the single act
of the defendant if that act gave him notice he was subject to a state's
jurisdiction. Justice Stevens pointed out in Shaffer that a person should
reasonably expect to be subject to a state's jurisdiction based solely on
his physical presence there.' 0 '
The Supreme Court repudiated state sovereignty concerns in Insur-
ance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee.10 2 The case came to
the Supreme Court on the issue of whether a Pennsylvania district court
could establish personal jurisdiction over a defendant as a sanction for
failing to comply with discovery orders regarding jurisdictional facts.'
0 3
The Court upheld jurisdiction.'
0 4
93 Id. at 294.
94 Justice Marshall called it the "mutually exclusive sovereignty of the States." 433 U.S. at 204.
95 Judge Ripple and Ms. Murphy conclude that transient jurisdiction permits judicial overreach-
ing by states that have mere transitoryjurisdiction. This deprives states with minimum contacts over
the parties and thus a possibly more desirable forum, of their opportunity to litigate the dispute.
This in turn creates significant strains on the system of interstate federalism that formed the main
concern in World-Wide Volkswagen. Ripple & Murphy, supra note 91, at 76-77.
96 The Court first looked for "affiliating circumstances" between the defendant and the forum
state as the test for minimum contacts. 444 U.S. at 295. The term "affiliating circumstances" is one
that the Court also used in defeating the exercise ofjurisdiction in Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235,
246 (1958), and Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84, 92 (1978).
97 444 U.S. at 295-97.
98 Id. at 297.
99 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
100 See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
101 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
102 456 U.S. 694 (1982). Given the Court's recent shifting on the issue, it remains to be seen how
long the decision in Insurance Corp. will last. At the time of this writing, however, it is the Supreme
Court's last pronouncement on the sovereignty issue.
103 Id. at 697. The case involved an action by a Delaware mining corporation with its principal
place of business in the Republic of Guinea to collect on business interruption insurance. The de-
fendants were 14 foreign insurance companies that challenged the personal jurisdiction of the Penn-
sylvania court. Id.
104 Id. at 710. The Court went to great lengths to reach the sovereignty issue. See id. at 711
(Powell, J., concurring). The Court did not discuss minimum contacts.
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Justice White, writing the majority opinion, stated that jurisdictional
restrictions are a function of due process which acts to protect individual
liberty and not federalism. 0 5 Justice White explained that the constitu-
tional requirement of personal jurisdiction is a right that protects the
individual. If it were otherwise, he reasoned, a defendant could not
waive the requirement and a court could not estop a defendant from as-
serting it.106
This language seemingly does away with jurisdiction based on the
concepts of sovereignty or state power that had supported physical pres-
ence since Pennoyer. If personal jurisdiction is a purely personal right,
then a state has no authority to assert power over an individual based on
its right of sovereignty since sovereignty is not a jurisdictional concern.
If the transient presence doctrine continues to have any theoretical valid-
ity, it must be based on the purposeful availment and foreseeability test
of the minimum contacts analysis of International Shoe, or on another the-
ory taking physical presence outside the minimum contacts requirement
altogether.
III. The Post-Shaffer Transient Presence Cases
After the Shaffer decision several commentators quickly declared the
death of personal jurisdiction based solely on physical presence.
10 7
Lower courts are split. But most courts claim that jurisdiction based on
physical presence remains alive and well.' 08 Courts that support the con-
tinued viability of the transient presence rule rely on the state sover-
eignty concept' 0 9 or an interpretation of Shaffer that takes the rule
outside the scope of the holding.110
A. Transient Jurisdiction Affirmed
In 1978, the year after Shaffer, the First Circuit in Driver v. Helms"'
held that personal jurisdiction established by national service of process
under Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12 was proper by
placing it under the sovereign power basis." 3 The court found that Inter-
105 Id. at 703 n.10.
106 Id. at 704.
107 See supra note 3.
108 See, e.g., Amusement Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985); Driver v. Helms,
577 F.2d 147 (lst Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979); Opert v. Schmid, 535 F. Supp. 591
(S.D.N.Y. 1982); Ruggieri v. General Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525, 529 (D. Colo. 1982) (dic-
tum); O'Brien v. Eubanks, 701 P.2d 614, 616 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 272
(1985); Hutto v. Plagens, 254 Ga. 512, 513, 330 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1985); Gant v. Gant, 254 Ga. 239,
327 S.E.2d 723, 725 (1985); Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 733-34, 273 S.E.2d 22, 23-24
(1980); McLeod v. McLeod, 383 A.2d 39 (Me. 1978); Mannio v. Davenport, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 299
N.W.2d 823, 826 (1981) (dictum); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273
N.W.2d 285, 287 (1979) (dictum).
109 See supra notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
110 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
111 577 F.2d 147 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1114 (1979).
112 "All process other than a subpoena may be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the
state in which the district court is held, and, when authorized by a statute of the United States or by
these rules, beyond the territorial limits of that state." FED. R. Crv. P. 4(f).
113 577 F.2d at 156. The court andlogized the United States to a single state for jurisdictional
purposes under statutes that allow service against defendants anywhere in the country. Id. The
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national Shoe and Shaffer did not change the physical presence rule: "The
minimum contacts test was developed in cases testing the limits of a
state's jurisdiction over those not found within its boundaries."'1 4 The
court clearly adopted the view that Shaffer did not disturb the physical
presence exception included in the International Shoe holding,1 15 and thus
the power of a state over all persons present within its boundaries re-
mains intact.
The Fifth Circuit squarely faced the issue of transient jurisdiction in
Amusement Equipment, Inc. v. Mordelt. 116 Defendant Mordelt was person-
ally served while temporarily in New Orleans, Louisiana. The Fifth Cir-
cuit exercised jurisdiction solely on service of process; the court noted
that the defendant did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Louisi-
ana to support jurisdiction. 117
Judge Goldberg, writing for a unanimous panel, asserted both sover-
eignty concerns, and an interpretation of Shaffer taking transient pres-
ence outside of the minimum contacts requirement, to hold that "the
rule of transient jurisdiction has life left in it yet." 118 The court agreed
with the First Circuit's view of sovereignty in Driver 119 and elaborated on
why transient presence jurisdiction did not violate due process. 120 The
court distinguished exercises of sovereignty through jurisdiction from
limitations on sovereignty.'21 The court reasoned that since states unde-
niably retain some sovereignty, even after recent Supreme Court cases
limiting it, they may still exercise it in the quintessential sovereign act-
the assertion of power over persons within their territory. 122 The court
found that Shaffer did not mandate elimination of the transient presence
rule. The court noted that none of the line of Supreme Court personal
jurisdiction cases dealt with an individual served within the state.' 23 In-
stead, the Supreme Court in Shaffer directed attention to International Shoe
which explicitly recognized a physical presence exception to the mini-
mum contacts rule.124
Judge Goldberg, however, recognized that the recent Supreme
Court cases have left a wooden, mechanical application of the physical
court stated that the authority of the United States as a unit was the same as a single state within its
territory. Id. n.25. The case involved a class action suit against federal government officials in their
individual and official capacities for illegal interference with the mails. Id. at 149. The court allowed
jurisdiction based on service of process. Id. at 155.
114 Id. The court also stated that when a defendant is found and served within the territorial
limits of a state, "minimum contacts need not be established, and jurisdiction may be asserted on the
basis of the state's sovereignty." Id. at 156 n.25.
115 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
116 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985).
117 Id. at 267 n.4. The Louisiana district court made explicit findings on minimum contacts. 595
F. Supp. 125, 130-31 (E.D. La. 1984). The district court granted defendant's motion to dismiss since
the court interpreted Shaffer as eliminating transient jurisdiction. Id. at 128-29 n.3.
118 779 F.2d at 271. The court first noted the conclusions of commentators that Shaffer severely
undercut the transient presence basis and admitted that "Shaffer rendered the black letter gray." Id.
at 268.
119 Id. at 269 n.10. Seesupra note 111.
120 779 F.2d at 268.
121 Id. at 270.
122 Id.
123 Id. at 268.
124 779 F.2d at 269. See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
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presence rule impossible. Judge Goldberg cited Insurance Corp. 125 where
the Supreme Court made clear that courts must measure assertions of
personal jurisdiction against the due process clause and considerations
of fairness. 126 Judge Goldberg concluded that jurisdiction based on in-
state service of process conformed with fairness principles. 127 The court
emphasized that the defendant's purposeful act of entering the forum
put him at risk of being sued there: "By entering Louisiana, he subjected
himself to sovereign powers from which, had he remained outside the
state, he was otherwise protected."' 28 The court held that in-state ser-
vice was decisive since "a traditional notion of fair play and substantial
justice has been that presence alone is sufficient to support personal ju-
risdiction."1 29 This approach clearly emphasized elements of foresee-
ability and echoed Justice Stevens' concurrence in Shaffer. 30
Despite holding that mere presence alone comports with due pro-
cess, the court found that other factors showed jurisdiction in Louisiana
was fair.' 3 1 Even though these factors would not amount to sufficient
minimum contacts for an out-of-state defendant, they did mitigate
against the harshness of an application of the transient presence rule.
3 2
Presumably, although Judge Goldberg did not address the issue, the
court would not apply the transient presence rule in a situation where it
would be unfair to do so.
133
Most of the other courts holding mere presence is sufficient to con-
ferjurisdiction also read Shaffer to not disturb the physical presence ex-
125 See supra note 102.
126 779 F.2d at 269-70.
127 Id. at 270.
128 Id.
129 Id.
130 See supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
131 Induded among these factors were that the defendant entered the state for business reasons
related to the subject matter of the litigation, the burden of litigating in Louisiana was not signifi-
cantly greater than other available forums, and the defendant could protect himself from inconven-
ience by using forum non conveniens, change of venue, or choice of law rules. Id. at 271. Aluminal
Indus., Inc. v. Newtown Commercial Assocs., 89 F.R.D. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) takes this approach. In
Aluminal Indus. the court routinely upheld jurisdiction based solely on service of process since mini-
mum contacts were lacking. The court dismissed Shafer as inapplicable in cases where the defendant
has been personally served in the state. Id. at 329. However, the court mitigated the potential
harshness of this interpretation by granting the defendant's motion for a change of venue, based
mostly on consideration of convenience for the parties and witnesses. Id. at 330. Opert v. Schmid,
535 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) similarly held that Shafer did not change the black letter law that
physical presence confers jurisdiction. The court stated that it was "unwilling to reject this estab-
lished jurisdictional principle without direction from higher authority." Id. at 594. The court then
went on to dismiss the action on forum non conveniens grounds. The court found that the parties
should properly bring the action in a West German court, citing "public interest" factors. The court
concluded that the only factor favoring jurisdiction in New York was the plaintiff's choice of forum.
The court then weighed the reasons for and against retaining the case and determined that "where
the burden to defendants of trying the case here is likely to be great, and there is little public interest
in the case, application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens is appropriate." Id. at 595.
132 779 F.2d at 271.
133 This approach would eliminate absurd application of the rule, such as in Grace, supra notes 60-
63 and accompanying text. The court looked at the problem as a practical one, and found that with
this defendant in this situation it was fair to assertjurisdiction based on the single act of being served
with process while within the state. Physical presence within a state becomes the one contact neces-
sary under due process.
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ception contained in International Shoe.13 4 The Georgia Supreme Court in
Humphrey v. Langford135 stated that the Supreme Court has yet to rule on
the exact issue. This court did not stop there; a unanimous court found
that purposeful availment played a role. The court said that a person
transiently within Georgia could expect to be protected by its laws and
should therefore be subject to the jurisdiction of its courts.' 36 The court
mentioned, but unfortunately did not develop, the idea that physical
presence alone may fulfill a minimum contacts requirement. 137 The
court also discussed the public policy benefits of continuing the transient
presence rule. The court indicated that due process equally protects
plaintiffs' and defendants' rights.1 38 If a defendant cannot be sued wher-
ever found, he may avoid suit altogether by not establishing minimum
contacts with any one state.' 39
B. Transient Jurisdiction Rejected
A few courts have interpreted Shaffer to eliminate the transient pres-
ence rule. In fact, given the widespread criticism of the rule in the litera-
ture and the pronouncements of its death following Shaffer, it is perhaps
surprising that so few courts have taken strong stances against the rule.
The district court in Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp. 140 declared that
jurisdiction based on a state's sovereign power was "conclusively de-
clared obsolescent" by the broad language of Shaffer.' 4' But the case in-
volved a corporate defendant and thus cannot be read as holding that
transient jurisdiction for individuals violates due process. However, the
court left no doubt as to its view of the mandates of Shaffer. The court
134 See, e.g., Ruggieri v. General Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525, 529 (D. Colo. 1982) (citing
Pennoyer, supra notes 16-26) ("If a defendant is physically present in the forum state, and is properly
served with process, he will normally be subject to the personal jurisdiction of that state's courts
.. ") (dictum); O'Brien v. Eubanks, 701 P.2d 614, 616 (Colo. App. 1984) (citing International Shoe,
supra notes 39-45, and Pennoyer, supra notes 16-26) ("Where, as in this case, service is made upon a
natural person found within the state, the minimum contacts analysis is inapplicable."); Hutto v.
Plagens, 254 Ga. 512, 513, 330 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1985) (reiterates the "long-standing principle that
service of process on a nonresident person who is physically present in the state, albeit briefly, is a
sufficient basis for an personam jurisdiction"); Gant v. Gant, 254 Ga. 239, 327 S.E.2d 723, 725
(1985) (jurisdiction based solely on service of process is proper); Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga.
732, 733-34, 273 S.E.2d 22, 23-24 (1980); Mannio v. Davenport, 99 Wis. 2d 602, 299 N.W.2d 823,
826 (1981) ("The essence of personal jurisdiction is a matter of physical presence within, or mini-
mum contacts with, the state.") (dictum); Oxmans' Erwin Meat Co. v. Blacketer, 86 Wis. 2d 683, 273
N.W.2d 285, 287 (1979) (Supreme Court has not imposed a minimum contacts requirement on
jurisdiction where there is personal service) (dictum).
135 246 Ga. 732, 273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
136 Id. at 735, 273 S.E.2d at 24. It should be noted that the court stated this with no small degree
of chauvinism: "This sovereign state has an adequate court system and is capable of rendering jus-
tice between litigants as well as any court system." Id.
137 Id. at 733, 273 S.E.2d at 23.
138 Id. at 734, 273 S.E.2d at 24.
139 Id. The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine used this argument to uphold jurisdiction over a
defendant who resided outside of the country and had no contacts with any state. He was served
while on a two week visit to his parents' home in Maine before departing for Hong Kong. The
litigation did not arise out of any activities in Maine. If the court did not exercise jurisdiction based
on this transient presence, then the defendant would have been immune to suit in the United States.
McLeod v. McLeod, 383 A.2d 39, 41, 44 (Me. 1978).
140 448 F. Supp. 1079 (D. Kan. 1978).
141 Id. at 1088-89.
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stated that "physical presence is no longer either necessary or sufficient
for in personam actions." 142 Instead, a minimum contacts analysis is
necessary.' 43 Schreiber quotes Professor Leflar as saying that Shaffer
"proves beyond question that old jurisdictional dogma is not sacred. If
century-old law on in rem jurisdiction can be changed, so can other rules
that are believed to operate unfairly."'
144
Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of U.S.A. "45 contained similar dicta that
physical presence alone may no longer be sufficient. This case involved
jurisdiction over an unincorporated association based on the personal
service of one of its officers while present in the forum state.' 46 The
Third Circuit in Nehemiah treated the association like a corporation.
47
Accordingly, service on its agent would not, in the absence of minimum
contacts, conferjurisdiction.' 48 The court based this conclusion on Shaf-
fer.149 The court explained that if the presence of property no longer is
sufficient to grant jurisdiction, then "it is difficult to find a basis in logic
and fairness to conclude that the more fleeting physical presence of a
non-resident person can support personal jurisdiction."' 150 While this
language suggests that transient presence is insufficient for individuals,
the court stated that courts may continue to accept a physical presence
exception to the minimum contacts rule based on historical precedent.' 51
Thus, courts should limit Nehemiah's reasoning to corporations and unin-
corporated associations.
Only three cases have squarely held that the physical presence of an
individual, by itself, no longer confers jurisdiction. 5 2 The most exten-
sive analysis of the antiphysical presence cases came in Harold M. Pitman
Co. v. Typecraft Software.'S3 This court concluded that International Shoe
replaced the sovereignty basis of Pennoyer, and Shaffer declared a prefer-
ence that all courts judge assertions ofjurisdiction by a single minimum
142 Id. at 1089 (quoting Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner: An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26
U. KAN. L. REv. 61 (1977)).
143 Id.
144 R. LEFLAR, supra note 27, § 24A, at 43. But Professor Leflar also indicated that Shafer left a
number of questions unanswered, and said that the decision may not be as broad as a first look at its
language would indicate. Id. at 42.
145 765 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985).
146 Id. at 44. The president of the association was served at the Meadowlands Sports Complex in
NewJersey while attending a sports event unrelated to this litigation. The NewJersey district court
denied defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id.
147 Id. at 45-46.




152 Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software, 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Amusement
Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 595 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. La. 1984), rev'd, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985); Ber-
shaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 700 P.2d 347 (1985). Mordelt was specifically overruled on
this point. See supra text accompanying notes 116-24. The district court in Mordelt concluded that
Shafer rendered the theoretical underpinnings of physical presence, ie., the sovereignty concerns of
Pennoyer, obsolete. 595 F. Supp. at 129 n.3.
153 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Il. 1986). This case involved an action by Pitman, an Illinois corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in New Jersey, against Typecraft, a British company, and
O'Connor, individually and as an officer ofTypecraft. O'Connor was personally served with process
while transiently in Illinois to attend a three-day trade convention. Id. at 306-07.
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contacts standard.1 54 The court added the public policy argument that
allowing jurisdiction based on presence alone over an individual but not
his property accords an individual less protection than his property. The
court characterized this situation as an "unfair result" that the Shaffer
Court could not have intended.
1 55
IV. A Framework Based on Purposeful Availment
The case law since Shaffer is fragmented and contradictory. Courts
have taken conflicting positions on the impact of Shaffer on the transient
presence rule. While it is clear that the physical presence rule no longer
stands on the firm ground of Pennoyer, it is not clear what standard will
replace the bright line rule. Since the outer limits of jurisdiction are
marked by the due process clause1 56 it is of vital constitutional impor-
tance to have a single standard for the assertion of in personam jurisdic-
tion based on physical presence. Courts should not allow decisions of
constitutional dimension to vary according to what part of the country
suit is brought. Supreme Court guidance has been conspicuously absent
in this area. However, given the Court's current direction, when the
Court rules on the issue it will probably put severe limitations on the use
of transitory presence jurisdiction. But it is not clear that these limita-
tions will eliminate it.
Significant reasons remain, even in this highly mobile age, for retain-
ing some form of a physical presence rule. Chief among these is the cer-
tainty of providing the plaintiff with a forum.1 57 If a defendant does not
have minimum contacts with or a domicile in any state he may be invul-
nerable to suit in America. While a physical presence rule will not pro-
tect a plaintiff where the defendant cannot be found anywhere, it
provides a potential forum. Sufficient protections exist to prevent unfair-
ness to the defendant.1 58
Even with the retention of a physical presence basis for jurisdiction,
the theoretical basis cannot be the same as during the Pennoyer era. Con-
siderations of state sovereignty that led to the power concept ofjurisdic-
tion have become outmoded. In their place the Supreme Court has put
considerations of fairness.1 59 Any assertion of jurisdiction based on
physical presence must pass muster under one of the various tests the
Supreme Court has used in describing the minimum contacts analysis.1 60
Likewise, courts should not justify the physical presence rule as a contin-
154 Id. at 312. See Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 209. The court's conclusion that Shaffer mandates that
courts judge all jurisdiction issues by the minimum contacts standard is undermined by the court's
heavy reliance on the district court opinion in Mordelt, a decision the Fifth Circuit subsequently
overruled.
155 626 F. Supp. at 313.
156 See generally R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 17, § 4.3.
157 See McLeod v. McLeod, 383 A.2d 39 (Me. 1978). See also Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732,
273 S.E.2d 22 (1980).
158 See infra notes 168-78 and accompanying text.
159 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 204 (1977).
160 Principally, this has been a triangular relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation. Id.
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uation of Pennoyer under the exception contained in International Shoe. 161
Recognizing physical presence as a sui generis 162 historical exception to
minimum contacts undercuts the entire basis for minimum contacts juris-
diction. Surely the Court in Shaffer did not intend such a result when it
said that all exercises ofjurisdiction rest on the single standard of mini-
mum contacts.' 63 By recognizing physical presence as an exception to
minimum contacts, courts are in reality continuing the outmoded theo-
retical framework of Pennoyer, a framework the Supreme Court specifi-
cally repudiated. 64
A better rationale is the purposeful availment analysis. Under this
rationale, courts base jurisdiction over a defendant on physical presence
because he has purposefully availed himself of the protection of the fo-
rum state's laws by voluntarily entering it.165 The defendant knowingly
assumes the risk that he will be called into that state's courts; by entering
that state he has served his own personal purpose and should not escape
the responsibilities of that privilege.
166
The revised Restatement provides a useful reformulation of the
physical presence rule. 167 It provides that "[a] state has power to exer-
cise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its terri-
tory unless the individual's relationship to the state is so attenuated as to
make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable."'' 6 8 Courts may ex-
ercise jurisdiction only where the defendant's relationship to the state
can be described as significant.' 69 Taken literally, it is hard to see how
this differs from a minimum contacts analysis. But taken in the context of
the traditional physical presence rule, it is a much looser standard than
minimum contacts because the presumption is in favor of finding juris-
diction when the defendant has been personally served in the forum
state.
A court should hold that physical presence is prima facie evidence of
a jurisdictional nexus, but not conclusive. If the defendant then pro-
duced evidence that this exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable,
the court should refuse to take jurisdiction. While this resembles dismis-
sal on forum non conveniens grounds, 170 the desision is actually based
161 See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
162 Of its own kind or class. BLACK'S LAW DxcnoNARY 1286 (5th ed. 1981).
163 See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
164 See Shafer, 433 U.S. at 204.
165 See id. at 217-19 (Stevens, J., concurring); supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text.
166 See Glen, An Analysis of "Mere Presence" and Other Traditional Bases ofJurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L.
REv. 607, 611-12 (1979). For example, a case like Grace, supra notes 60-63, could not happen under
a purposeful availment analysis. The defendant there did not voluntarily enter Arkansas for any
reason of his own. Rather, he was taken into Arkansas airspace by the unilateral act of another, the
airline on which he was a passenger. Because he did not affirmatively place himself under the pro-
tection of Arkansas law, there is no reasonable justification for allowing Arkansas to hold him ac-
countable in its courts, in the absence of other affiliating contacts.
167 For a discussion of the position the Second Restatement took before Shafer, see supra note 59
and accompanying text.
168 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 28 (Tent. Draft April 15, 1986).
169 Id. at comment b.
170 See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
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on jurisdictional grounds. The practical effect is negligible, 171 but the
distinction is important to note. Courts will also properly retain jurisdic-
tion based on the mere fact that the defendant would not likely be called
to court in another forum. 172 If no evidence exists that jurisdiction in
this forum is constitutionally unreasonable, then that court should retain
jurisdiction. Of course, this does not mean that the defendant has no
other relief. If the forum is seriously inconvenient, he may move for dis-
missal on forum non conveniens grounds. 173 Obviously, a finding that
the forum is inconvenient for litigation will require a lesser standard of
unreasonableness than the jurisdictional standard.174
In addition to the new constitutional requirement of reasonableness
and the doctrine of forum non conveniens, other protections exist for the
defendant to avoid suit in a state based solely on personal service there.
Traditionally, courts recognize several circumstances where personal ser-
vice while physically present in the forum does not confer jurisdiction. 175
Where the defendant's presence in the state is due to fraud or force,
courts should not exercise jurisdiction. 176 Immunity has also been
granted to nonresidents temporarily in the state to attend civil or crimi-
nal proceedings, whether as parties, witnesses, or attorneys. 177 How-
ever, many states are shifting away from the immunity concept and
grouping all arguments under forum non conveniens.
178
Much of the criticism of the transient presence rule points out that
the forum may have no connection with either the defendant or the sub-
ject matter of the litigation. ' 79 To mitigate against the dangers of forcing
the defendant to litigate in an inconvenient forum, courts should use the
doctrine of forum non conveniens' 80 in addition to requiring reasonable-
171 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 28 comment c (Tent. Draft April 15,
1986).
172 Id. at comment b. This result may seem self contradictory; if the court has no constitutional
basis forjurisdiction in the first place, then bare necessity should not create a constitutionally accept-
able basis. Under this analysis, however, special circumstances are what serve to divest a state that
presumptively has jurisdiction from that jurisdiction. Since the lack of an alternative forum is in
itself a special circumstance that calls for the court to retain jurisdiction, jurisdiction is simply not
relinquished, rather than acquired by special circumstance.
173 See infra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
174 See Lau v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 14 Wis. 2d 329, 111 N.W.2d 158, 165 (1961).
175 These immunities are a matter of local law, not constitutional mandates. See, e.g., R. LEFLAR,
supra note 27, § 27.
176 See, e.g., Wyman v. Newhouse, 93 F.2d 313 (2d Cir. 1937). In criminal trials, force or fraud is
no defense to jurisdiction. Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).
177 See, e.g., Shapiro & Son Curtain Corp. v. Glass, 348 F.2d 460 (2d Cir. 1965); Steelman v.
Fowler, 234 Ga. 706, 217 S.E.2d 285 (1975); Lyf-Alum, Inc. v. C. & M. Aluminum Supply Corp., 29
Wis. 2d 593, 139 N.W.2d 601 (1966). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 83
comment b (1971).
178 R. LEFLAR, supra note 27, § 27.
179 See, e.g., Posnak, A Unifonrm Approach toJudicialJurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the
"Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY LJ. 729, 744 (1981).
180 Factors commonly examined by courts in deciding whether to grant dismissal on forum non
conveniens grounds include: The relative ease of access to proof; the availability of process to ob-
tain attendance of unwilling witnesses; the relative expenses of litigating in different forums; the
administrative difficulties or burdens for the forum court in deciding a case without contacts to the
forum state; and the choice of law. For the leading case in the area, see Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,
330 U.S. 501 (1947).
Professor Ehrenzweig, one of the most vocal opponents of the transient presence rule, pre-
dicted that courts would eliminate it and replace it with a general forum non conveniens analysis.
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ness. A court that finds it is a seriously inconvenient forum should dis-
miss the case and send the parties to another, more convenient, specified
forum.' 81 With this doctrine courts should refuse jurisdiction over a case
that has no contacts with the forum by requiring the plaintiff to bring the
action in another forum.' 8 2 Courts are making increasing use of forum
non conveniens 8s and can successfully employ it to prevent abuses of
the physical presence rule. 8
4
V. Conclusion
Obtaining personal jurisdiction by personally serving the defendant
while he is physically present in the forum state has been one of the most
enduring principles of American law. While the decision ten years ago in
Shaffer cast significant doubt on the continued vitality of the doctrine in
the eyes of scholarly commentators, the decisions of most courts have
been otherwise.
8 5
Given the desire of courts to maintain presence based jurisdiction,
the possible advantages in doing so, and the availability of adequate safe-
guards to protect against unfair results, it seems clear that jurisdiction
based on physical presence will continue, at least until the Supreme
Court specifically holds otherwise. A superior analytical framework to
historical deference exists in a purposeful availment analysis. For now,
however, the ghost, if not the law, of Pennoyer lives on.
Eric P. Heichel
Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE
LJ. 289, 310-14 (1956).
181 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 (1971).
182 The court will normally condition dismissal on the defendant's agreement to submit to the
alternative forum's jurisdiction, or will stay its own dismissal until the defendant meets the condi-
tions imposed. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 84 comment e (1971).
183 R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 17, § 4.33.
184 Bernstine, supra note 3, at 67. But see Werner, Dropping the Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and
the Demise of Presence.Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV. 565, 590 (1979). *
185 One commentator referred to an "unsurmountable unwillingness ... to deny that a person
who is physically handed a summons within the territorial jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to
attend and be heard." Glen, supra note 166, at 613-14.
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